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1. INTRODUCTION 
The dynamic nature of many of today’s markets casts doubt on whether it is 
possible to construct sustainable competitive advantages (D´Aveni, 1994), including the 
maintenance of ‘first–mover advantages’. This fact is reflected by the way the study of 
competitive dynamics has gained strength (Hoskinsson et al., 1999). Strategies are 
indeed dynamic, which is why firms must be alert to their competitors’ moves and ready 
to respond.   
The interdependent nature of firms’ actions can be clearly seen in the 
relationship between pioneers and followers. Follower firms need to develop 
competitive behavior that will enable them to erode the pioneer’s advantage. Pioneer 
advantages, however, have been shown to be sustainable over many different industries 
(Robinson, 1988; Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Urban et al., 1986; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1998), even in fast-changing industries where it is easy to copy 
competitor’s actions (Makadok, 1998). This does not mean, though, that all strategies 
and actions taken by followers are equally ineffective at reducing the pioneer’s 
advantage. Our objective is to gauge how effective different types of competitive 
actions are at eroding the pioneer’s position.  
A firm has a range of alternatives - such as pricing actions, marketing actions, 
new product actions, capacity actions, and signaling actions – that can be used in the 
fight against competitors (Ferrier, 2001). These are all market actions, but a firm can 
also take the battle into the public policy arena with legal, regulatory, legislative and 
public relations issues (Spulber, 2003). These non-market actions can be used to 
construct competitive advantages and to offset competitive disadvantages (Baron, 1995, 
2002). The inclusion of non-market actions in business strategy is necessary in 
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industries where many opportunities are controlled by government (Baron, 1995). It is 
also critical when the business models and technologies are easily copied (De 
Figueiredo and Spiller, 2000). 
This study analyzes the effect of different market and non-market actions on the 
pioneer firm’s advantage in the European mobile telephone industry between 1997 and 
2000, the period when competition was introduced and developed in the market. During 
this period the industry was characterized by its dynamism and growth, measured in 
number of clients. We pay particular attention to market actions related to innovation, 
and pricing and promotion, and to non-market actions related to judicial issues.   
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it combines two 
lines of research on competitive dynamics: pioneer advantage and competitive actions 
(Ketchen et al., 2004). It also attempts a combined analysis of market and non-market 
actions, which, excepting Shaffer et al. (2000), is not common in empirical research 
(Hillman et al., 2004).  
Second, it considers judicial processes and decisions, and the effects of non-
market actions on the performance of firms. Despite increased research into non-market 
actions over the last two decades (Kein and Baysinger, 1988; Schuler, 1996; Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999), neither of these areas have received much attention (Hillman et al., 
2004).  
Third, this study includes all the European Union countries, plus Norway and 
Switzerland. Most studies on pioneer advantages have been carried out on US industrial 
firms (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). Something similar has happened with non-
market strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), which is not surprising considering the 
institutional differences among countries (Baron, 1997). 
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Finally, having information available on competitive actions over a four-year 
period allows us to perform a longitudinal study, one of the research opportunities in the 
competitive dynamics field (Ketchen et al., 2004).  
The paper is set out as follows. In the next section we present the conceptual 
foundations and put forward our hypotheses on the relationship between differences in 
pioneer and follower firms’ competitive behavior and the erosion of ‘first-mover 
advantages’. The empirical analysis is presented in the subsequent section. We conclude 
with a discussion of results and a review of implications, limitations and directions for 
future research. 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To construct competitive advantages a firm must embark on a series of actions 
that will always be closely watched – when not directly countered – by competitors. 
This makes analyzing the dynamic aspects of strategy ever more important. The 
performance of many firms depends not only on what they do, but also on what their 
rivals do (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991). This makes firms interdependent. Competition, 
then, is a dynamic process in which the participants make series of moves in the market 
that have significant effects on rivals (Chen and Hambrick, 1995).  
These aspects are even more important in dynamic markets, where the difficulty 
of building sustainable competitive advantages makes it advisable to replace them with 
a series of successive advantages over time (D´Aveni, 1994; Ferrier et al., 2001; 
MacMillan, 1988). In fast-changing environments, trying to hang onto an advantage 
based on specific resources or on static capacities for as long as possible will normally 
produce unnecessary costs for the firm (Fiol, 2001). 
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The construction of competitive advantages in fast-changing environments has 
been studied by the fields of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) and competitive 
dynamics (Smith et al., 1992). Both approaches are rooted in the Austrian School of 
Economics (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1973), one of whose basic propositions is the 
constant disequilibrium of the market.  
Dynamic capabilities studies the processes by which existing resources are 
enhanced or new resource configurations to address fast-changing environments are 
built (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), while competitive dynamics 
studies the business actions that these processes support. Empirical research on 
competitive dynamics has attempted to explain both the causes and consequences of 
actions and responses, especially the performance consequences of these dynamics 
(Smith et al., 2001).  
Competitive actions help firms build resource endowments (Young et al., 1996), 
establish market positions, and react to rivals’ moves. Researching pioneer advantages 
and how to erode them, then, lends itself to a dynamic analysis given the eminently 
interactive relationship between pioneer and follower firms: followers must take actions 
designed to erode the advantage of the pioneer, who must in turn react to these actions 
to conserve the advantage.   
Competitive Activity  
 A priori, it would appear that being active in the market should bring a 
competitive advantage in a fast-changing environment. An efficient firm, but one that 
does not make new competitive moves in the market, will soon see its competitive 
advantages eaten away by its more active rivals and will be unable to maintain its 
success over time (Schumpeter, 1942). Therefore, firms that continually launch new 
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competitive moves and react to those of their competitors will obtain competitive 
advantages (D´Aveni, 1994; Smith et al., 2001). All in all, then, in dynamic industries it 
is clear that firms that launch more market actions improve their performance and 
worsen that of their rivals (Smith et al., 1992). Empirical research has found a positive 
relationship between performance and number of competitive actions in a given period 
(Young et al., 1996; Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Miller and Chen, 1994; Ferrier et al., 
1999). In addition, a significant negative linear relationship between a firm’s 
competitive intensity and its rivals’ stock market wealth (Ferrier and Lee, 2002) has 
been found. 
This suggests that if follower firms have a more aggressive competitive behavior 
and carry out more actions than pioneers, they will make bigger inroads into the 
pioneer’s market share. This leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The more competitive actions followers take in relation to 
pioneers, the bigger the erosion of the pioneer’s market share will be. 
Types of actions 
Although some research has been done on the strategic behavior of pioneers and 
followers (De Castro and Chrisman, 1995), the behavior patterns that the two conform 
to are still not clear. They can use different types of actions, or the same actions with 
different degrees of success. In fact, a fundamental advantage of followers is that they 
can learn from the pioneer’s mistakes (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Kerin et al., 
1992).  
A firm can use several types of market and non-market actions to implement its 
strategy. Each of these will have distinct consequences in terms of resources involved 
and degree of irreversibility. This makes it likely that their ability to erode (in the case 
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of follower firms) or defend (in the case of pioneer firms) the first-mover advantage will 
also be distinct, as will the possibilities of putting them into practice. Among market 
actions Schnaars (1994) highlights the role of innovation, lower prices and marketing to 
eliminate the pioneer’s advantage, while among non-market actions Baumol (1993) 
calls attention to the use of litigation. We will go on to analyze the relationship between 
each of these and the maintenance of the pioneer’s advantage in the mobile telephone 
industry. 
Innovation 
 It is well known that innovation brings competitive advantages (Schumpeter, 
1934; Bayus et al., 2003). Smith et al. (1992) showed that the launch of new products 
brought greater benefits to firms than other actions such as price cuts or advertising 
campaigns. A positive and significant relationship has also been detected between the 
rapid introduction of incremental product innovations and performance measured by 
stock market wealth (Lee et al., 2000), market share (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995) or 
sales growth (Ferrier, 2000). 
Follower firms can erode pioneer advantages most easily through innovation, 
especially in technology intensive industries (Golder and Tellis, 1993; Carpenter and 
Sawhney, 1996). Technology improvements have been empirically proved to be an 
important source of competitive advantage for followers (Bohlmann et al., 2002). 
Likewise, Shankar et al. (1998) have shown that when new entrants are innovators they 
create a competitive advantage and grow more rapidly than the pioneer firm. This all 
leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The more innovation actions followers take in relation to 
pioneers, the bigger the erosion of the pioneer’s market share will be.  
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Pricing and promotion 
Price reductions and promotions, both permanent and temporary, affect sales in 
the short term more than any other marketing action (Tellis, 1988; Sethuraman and 
Tellis, 1991; Deighton et al., 1994; Nagle and Holden, 2002).  This is why they are so 
commonly used to increase market share, in spite of their negative impact on 
profitability (Ailawadi et al., 2001). Price reductions and promotions boost demand 
for a product (Folkes et al., 1993; Ailawadi and Neslin, 1998; Ailawadi et al., 2001). 
It has been shown that they are a good tool for capturing new clients and increasing 
the consumption of existing ones (primary demand) (Bell et al., 1999; Van Heerde et 
al., 2000; Nijs et al., 2001). They also provide a good way of tempting clients away 
from rival firms (secondary demand) (Gupta, 1988; Bell et al., 1999; Ailawadi and 
Neslin, 1998). 
Follower firms tend to compete by lowering their prices when they are not able to 
find sources of differentiation (Covin et al., 1999). This makes it likely that follower 
firms will set rock-bottom prices to increase their market share at the expense of the 
pioneer (Kotler, 1997; Dutta et al., 2002). 
Therefore, if follower firms are more active cutting prices and using marketing 
campaigns than pioneers, they will be able to take market share from the pioneer – 
which brings us to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The more pricing and promotion actions followers take in relation 
to pioneers, the bigger the erosion of the pioneer’s market share will be. 
Non-market strategy 
Non-market actions complement –sometimes even replace– more conventional 
actions designed to implant the competitive strategy (Yoffie and Bergenstein, 1985; 
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Baron, 1995, 1997). Firms use them to deal with constraints imposed by legal 
regulations and social concerns (Spulber, 2003). Nowadays, “using legal tools for 
competitive advantage is a requirement – not an option - in business” (Shell, 2004). 
Managers need to understand and use them (Keim, 1981) with the same long-term 
perspective required by the rest of the firm’s strategic decisions (Yoffie, 1988). 
In this study we focus on legal actions that involve filing suits to courts or 
regulatory agencies. These measures may be taken for different purposes, such as 
protecting rights, handicapping a competitor, or gaining a direct advantage (Baron, 
2002). In other words, the decision to take legal action depends more on strategic than 
legal considerations (Shell, 2004). The use of private anti-monopoly suits has, in fact, 
delayed competition instead of promoting it (Posner, 1976).  
Entangling firms in lawsuits, with the accompanying publicity they bring, 
negatively affects the defendant’s reputation (sham litigation). Measures of this type can 
be more effective than conventional actions like advertising campaigns (Keim, 1981). 
First, a lawsuit for abuse of a dominant position can turn public opinion against the 
incumbent firm and cause its sales to drop. Second, legal action can distract the 
attention of the managers of the firm taken to court (Salop and White, 1986). Litigation 
is a useful strategy even if it is ultimately unsuccessful, as it is guaranteed to distract, 
delay, and bring costs to rivals (Baumol, 1993; De Figueiredo and Spiller, 2000). This is 
true even if the legal case is built on weak arguments (Shell, 2004). Third, in fast-
changing markets surprising the competition is vital (D´Aveni, 1998). Legal actions are 
probably more unexpected and imaginative than competitive actions, a factor that may 
increase their effectiveness. In fact, it has been shown that litigation between firms 
causes the defendant significant losses of wealth (Bhagat et al., 1998; Bizjak and Coles, 
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1995). In addition, the possibility of having restrictions placed on competitive behavior 
is more damaging than the threat of fines (Bizjak and Coles, 1995). 
Therefore, if follower companies are more active than pioneers in taking legal 
action, we expect the following hypothesis to be correct:  
Hypothesis 4: The more legal actions followers take in relation to pioneers, the 
bigger the erosion of the pioneer’s market share will be.  
To sum up, followers have a series of market and non-market actions at their 
disposal that can significantly erode the pioneer’s advantage. The model we put forward 
is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1] 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Empirical setting 
The empirical setting for our study is the European mobile telephone industry. 
We specifically focus on companies that are present in the EU, Norway and 
Switzerland1 with digital technology (GSM-1800, DCS-1800), also known as second 
generation systems.   
Providing mobile telephone services depends on gaining access to a scarce 
resource: the frequency spectrum. Any company wishing to operate in this industry 
needs to obtain a license from the regulatory body of the country in which it wants to 
work2.  These licenses limit the geographical market where you can work, so companies 
compete in national markets. 
                                                          
1
 Norway and Switzerland are included because the characteristics of their mobile telephone industries are 
similar to those of the other countries in the sample and because of the high level of penetration of this 
service.   
2
 We focus on companies that develop their own mobile telephone network with the idea of later 
exploiting it. We do not consider ‘virtual operators’ whose only goal is to exploit networks that third 
parties have developed. 
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The mobile telephone industry has gone through three stages, each clearly 
defined by the technology used. The first began in the 1980s with the commercialization 
of analog, or first-generation, systems3. As the analog networks of the different 
operators were incompatible with each other, it was impossible to connect networks 
either within or between countries. The monopolies that operated in the conventional 
wireline telephone industry obtained licenses to work with this technology4.  
Digital, or second-generation, systems began to be offered in some EU countries 
at the beginning of 1993, first GSM-900 and then DCS-18005. These systems had the 
advantage of offering compatibility to operators in the EU, Norway and Switzerland: a 
call could start in one operator’s network and end in another’s. With the arrival of this 
technology governments decided to open their markets to competition, though not at the 
same time. In Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Portugal licenses were immediately 
granted6, thereby eliminating the monopoly that had existed with analog technology. In 
Switzerland and Luxembourg, however, the regulatory bodies took more than four years 
to grant a second license. In Finland, the company that was working with analog 
technology received its license to work with digital technology almost a year later than 
the first mover.  
Licenses for third generation systems (UMTS) were granted to companies in 
2001. This technology uses a wider bandwidth, which opens the door to services such as 
                                                          
3
 These systems could operate in a bandwidth of 450 or 900 Megahertz (MHz). 
4
 The United Kingdom was the only country to grant a license to operate with analog technology to a 
company (Vodafone) that was not working in the fixed telephone market. Greece and Luxembourg are the 
two countries where no companies worked with analog technology.  
5
 These systems could operate in a bandwidth of 900 or 1800 MHz respectively. 
6
 One of these licenses was, however, for a company that was already operating with analog technology. 
Although most of the companies operating with analog technology were monopolies, they were not 
discouraged from working with digital technology. For example, in Austria, Belgium and Ireland (among 
others), digital licenses were only granted to the analog operators, who wasted no time in starting 
operations.      
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downloading MP3 sound files and MP4 video files, along with high-speed Internet 
access. This network will be compatible worldwide. 
There are, then, two types of technological change in the mobile telephone industry 
(Figure 3.1):  
1. Radical  
When going from one technological generation to another: This change obliges 
the operator to upgrade parts of the existing network such as base stations7. The 
new technology offers better voice and data transmission. 
2. Incremental or continuos  
a) When introducing small improvements to the technology: For example, going 
from TMA 450 to TMA 900 in an analog system or from GSM 900 to DCS 
1800 in a digital system.  
b) When introducing new services with the same technology: For example, the 
GSM system allows data transmission (up to 9,600 bits/sec), short message 
services, e-mail and Internet access, etc. It also allows additional services such 
as redirecting calls, three-way calls, holding calls and restrictions on in-coming 
and out-going calls. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1]     
The mobile telephone industry has a number of features that make it particularly 
well suited to a study of the sustainability of pioneer advantages in a fast-changing 
environment. 
First, it is a regulated industry where the license constitutes the main resource 
and is a prerequisite to enter the market. Once in the market, the pioneer would not 
                                                          
7
 These are the fixed installations with antennas, transceivers, power, etc necessary for communication 
among the mobile telephone users in the base station’s area of coverage.  
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appear to enjoy significant advantages. The technology is accessible to all the 
competitors. The cost of changing from one operator to another is the only restraining 
factor, specifically the lack of telephone number portability until 20008 and the fact that 
network economies permit better conditions to be offered to the network’s own 
members. On the other hand, incumbent operators have been forced to allow 
competitors to use their base stations during an agreed time.   
Second, it is a highly concentrated industry (a maximum of five operators in 
each national market). This structure makes it more likely that companies will be 
mutually dependent, which in turn makes it easier to spot the competitive actions of all 
the companies operating in the countries under study. Most research up to now – in an 
attempt to guarantee the existence of competitive actions - has focused only on non-
diversified US companies with high levels of sales (Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996; 
Young et al., 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999).   
Finally, the number of users of digital mobile telephone services has increased 
greatly in a short time – something that makes analysis possible in highly dynamic 
environments (D’Aveni, 1994). Graph 3.1 shows the service penetration at the 
beginning and end of the sample under study.  
[INSERT GRAPH 3.1] 
 Sample Selection 
As we stated in the previous section, the sample for this study comes from 
companies that operate in the digital mobile telephone industry with GSM 900 or/and 
DCS 1800 networks9. The sample for this study consists of 52 European mobile 
telephone companies – 22 market pioneers and 30 follower firms - that operate in the 
                                                          
8
 Only the United Kingdom brought forward the portability of numbers to 1999.  
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different countries of the European Union, Norway and Switzerland10. We define a 
market pioneer firm as one that was the first to commercialize mobile telephone 
services in a specific geographical market. In all other cases we define the firms as 
followers11. 
We constructed a database containing competitive activity information between 
pioneer and follower firms from 1997 to 200012. We have taken 1997 as the first year of 
the sample because at this time there were at least two firms competing in the digital 
technology market in all of the countries. It is, then, possible to study a group of pioneer 
firms (those that were able to reap the potential benefits of entering the digital 
technology market first) as well as the followers. Our cut-off point was 2000 because in 
2001 third generation (UMTS) licenses began to be granted13. No firms in this industry 
have disappeared, thus avoiding the problems of survival bias pointed out by 
VanderWerf and Mahon (1997). 
The study uses the number and characteristics of competitive moves to measure 
competitive behavior. We have used structured content analysis (Jauch et al., 1980), a 
technique employed in many other studies of dynamic strategy (overviews are found in 
Grimm and Smith (1997) and Ferrier et al. (2001)), to identify the competitive moves of 
all the companies under study. Although most research on competitive dynamics has 
used an annual aggregate (Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 1995), in this study we use six-month 
                                                                                                                                                                          
9
 From now on, all companies referred to in the study will have and commercialize GSM 900 and/or DCS 
1800 networks.  
10
 Sweden has been excluded from the sample because the three operators here started up at the same 
time.   
11
 In this study we do not take into account Golder and Tellis’s (1993) concept of ‘pioneer product’, 
because infrastructure suppliers and operators develop the new technologies in the mobile telephone 
industry together. 
12
 As some of the companies began their commercial activity after 1997, we have included information 
from the time that they began to operate in the industry until the end of 2000. 
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periods because it enables us to collect more information on the dynamics of the 
competitive process. 
The data on operators’ competitive actions were obtained by electronically 
searching the main general and business newspapers in the countries where they were 
working, along with several European trade journals from the telecommunications 
industry - all included in the Reuters database14.      
We collected our data in the following way. First, the authors, with the help of 
several Strategic Management professors and professionals working in the industry, 
identified the most common types of actions in the European digital mobile telephone 
industry and sorted them into categories such as innovation, pricing and promotions, 
and legal (see Table 3.1).  Second, we searched for all news items - by company and 
year – published in the newspapers and trade journals where the operator was working. 
Third, the coders15 read all the new items obtained in the previous stage and entered the 
articles they felt contained information on a competitive move in a database16. Out of a 
total of 22,391 articles selected in the second stage, 1,776 were coded as competitive 
actions. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.1] 
Intercoder reliability is needed in content analysis because it measures how far 
the different judges tend to assign exactly the same rating to items (Tinsley and Weiss, 
2000). To verify the level of ‘intercoder agreement’ among coders we had them go over 
                                                                                                                                                                          
13
 This innovation is interesting in the competitive process of the companies, but because no company 
commercialized the technology until after 2004 – plus the press speculation about the granting of licenses 
in 2001 – we decided to exclude data from the sample after 2000. 
14
 This electronic database is useful because it gives us a summary in English of all the news items 
published on the telecommunications industry in the main general and business newspapers of the 
countries under study. We decided to omit Luxembourg due to lack of information.   
15
 One of the authors and two strategic management students who had been specially trained for the task 
were the coders. 
16
 To avoid repeating news stories only the earliest chronological appearance of a news item was retained. 
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10% of the news items from the sample together. The three coders agreed on the 
identification and classification in 97% of the actions17. The Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen 
1960, 1968) average was 0.94218. Both coefficients indicate a high degree of intercoder 
reliability (Neuendorf, 2002), which is important because it allows the researcher to 
divide the coding work among many different coders (Neuendorf, 2002). In this case, 
90% of the remaining news items were coded by just one person. 
Measurement of variables 
Independent variable 
We have used four variables of competitive activity. For each one we have 
calculated a difference score by subtracting the follower’s value from that of the pioneer 
(Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier et al., 2002). 
Competitive intensity. The total number of competitive actions taken by the 
follower firm ‘j’ in a specific period and market minus those taken by the 
pioneer firm ‘i’. 
Innovation actions. The total number of innovation actions taken by the 
follower firm ‘j’ in a specific period and market minus those taken by the 
pioneer firm ‘i’. 
Pricing and Promotion actions. The total number of price cutting or 
promotional actions taken by the follower firm ‘j’ in a specific period and 
market minus those taken by the pioneer firm ‘i’. 
Legal actions. The total number of legal actions taken by the follower firm ‘j’ in 
a specific period and market minus those taken by the pioneer firm ‘i’. 
 
                                                          
17
 Percent agreement (PA)1,2=0.964; PA1,3=0.964; PA2,3=0.982. 
18
 Cohen’s Kappa (CK)1,2=0.931; CK1,3=0.930; CK2,3=0.965. 
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Dependent variable    
We have used a measurement of how far the follower firm ‘j’ eroded the market 
share of the pioneer firm ‘i’ as the variable dependent (Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 
2001)19; this is a commonly used relative performance variable in this field.  
Erosionijtm = (Gapij(t-1)m-Gapijt)m),   where            Gapijmt= ln(CMimt)-ln(CMjtm), 
      i= 1, 2,...I pioneer firms 
      j=1,2,...J follower firms 
      t=1, 2, …T periods 
     m=1, 2,...M countries 
         CM= market share 
 We obtained the information on each firm’s market share and geographical 
market from the trade journal Mobile Communications20. 
 Control variables  
We included five variables in the analysis to control for the potential effects in 
the erosion of the pioneer’s market share. The exact definitions of the control variables 
are given in Table 3.2. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.2] 
 It has been shown that being the first entrant in the market is less important than 
being alone in the market for a long period of time (Huff and Robinson, 1994; Brown 
and Latín, 1994). The reason for this is that the pioneer company can exploit the 
advantages of being first for longer (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; Carpenter and 
Nakamoto, 1989; Robinson et al., 1992). In addition, many studies have proved that 
there is a strong relation between order of entry and performance (Lee et al., 2000; 
Makadok, 1998; Green et al., 1995; Kalyanaram and Wittink, 1994). It has been 
empirically shown how in some cases, however, an early second entrant has obtained 
                                                          
19
 It is possible for more than one company to enter a new geographical market at the same time. In this 
case, these companies are classified as pioneers, even though they have not been operating in a monopoly 
situation. 
20
 We are grateful to Telefónica Móviles for giving us access to this source of information. 
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better performance than the pioneer company (Conner, 1988; Smith et al., 1992), thus 
negating the first entrant’s potential advantage. All of this led us to include the variables 
‘months in monopoly’, which reflects the time that  governments took to open their 
markets to competition, and ‘order of entry’, which indicates which follower firm began 
to compete in the industry first.      
 Another factor that is relevant to the level of competition and the performance of 
the firms is industry life cycle (Porter, 1980). This approach includes the variables 
‘penetration’ and ‘growth’ as proxies for the stage of the life cycle of the mobile 
telephone service in each geographical market analyzed. Several studies have shown the 
importance of these structural variables in firms’ performance (Deephouse, 1999; 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; Pan et al., 1999)21.    
 Finally, we have included a variable that measures the market share that the 
pioneer company had in the period previous to the study. This is important as the bigger 
a company’s market share, the easier it is to take away  (Ferrier et al., 1999; Caves et 
al., 1984; Davies and Geroski, 1997).  
 Model Specification 
To test the hypotheses, we performed multiple regression analyses using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) appropriate for processing panel data. The following 
equation tests Hypothesis 1, concerning ‘competitive intensity’22: 
Erosionijtm=0+ 1*Competitive Intensityitjm+ 2*Months in monopolym + 
3*Market Growthtm+ 4*Service Penetrationtm+ 5*Orderj 
+6*Pioneer’s market sharei(t-1)m+itjm   
    
 
          
                                                          
21
 The variable ‘concentration’ has been used in previous studies. We have not included it in this model 
because of its high correlation with ‘pioneer’s market share’ in the previous period (0.84) and with 
‘months in monopoly’ (0.58).    
22
 As ‘erosion’ takes account of the effect at the end and beginning of period ‘t’, we have not backdated 
the dependent variables for any period.    
(1) 
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Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 address the effect of the type of action on the erosion of 
the first entrant’s advantage. We test these hypotheses with a second model similar to 
that specified in equation (1). We remove the independent variable ‘competitive 
intensity’ and add three other independent variables: ‘innovation’, ‘pricing and 
promotion’, and ‘legal actions’. 
The analysis of longitudinal data with ordinary least squares is subject to 
violations of the conventional suppositions, mainly homocedasticity and auto-
correlation. Not taking account of these problems could cause the estimations to be 
biased, resulting in an inflated statistical F value (Bergh and Holbein, 1997). 
In our case, with information on firms from different countries, it is highly likely 
that we have a problem of heterocedasticity. The Cook-Weisberg statistic indicates the 
presence of heterocedasticity when using models of ordinary least squares. To get 
around this problem, we used generalized least squares – specifying that the error 
structure was heterocedastic – to ensure that the standard errors were robust. 
To study the possible presence of serial correlation we performed the 
Wooldridge test, which confirmed the existence of an auto-correlation problem in the 
data. To account for the panel structure of the data, we used a generalized least squares 
estimator for the linear regression that corrects for the error term auto-correlation within 
the time-series panels. 
Table 3.3 gives the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and 
control variables, including mean and standard deviations. The multicollinearity 
between the dependent and independent variables could present difficulties as some 
Pearson correlation coefficients are statistically high. Variance inflation factors (VIF) 
reflect the impact of multicollinearity on each independent variable in the model. After 
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calculating the VIF for all the variables, we found that none of them was higher than 2 
(see Table 3.4). As the rule forbids these values to be higher than 10 (Nester et al., 
1985; Chaterjee and Price, 1991), we can conclude that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in this study23.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.3] 
[INSERT TABLE 3.4] 
3. RESULTS 
Table 3.5 reports the regression results for the models that examine the 
relationship between erosion of the first-mover’s market share and the differences in 
competitive behavior of pioneer firms and followers. The regression linear 1 model 
shows the effect of competitive intensity on the erosion of the first entrant’s market 
share. Model 2 shows the differences in the type of actions that pioneer and follower 
firms use. Both models are significant (chi-square for covariates significant at p=0.001).  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that differences in level of competitive intensity should affect 
the erosion of the first entrant’s market share. This hypothesis is not supported (model 1). 
The fact that a follower firm carries out more competitive actions than the pioneer is 
unrelated to market share erosion.  
We make the argument, however, that in theory not all competitive actions would 
have the same effect on the erosion of the first entrant’s market share. For this reason, in 
model 2 we distinguish between different types of competitive actions such as innovation, 
pricing and promotion, and legal.     
Hypothesis 2 explores whether the differences in launching innovation actions 
between follower firms and pioneers affect the first entrant’s advantage. We hypothesized 
                                                          
23
 We have also removed variables like ‘concentration’ because the correlation with the variable CM1d 
was 0.81. 
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that when new entrants take more innovation actions than pioneer companies the erosion 
of the first entrant’s market share will be positively affected. The variable ‘innovation 
actions’ in model 2 turned out to be insignificant. 
The coefficient for the ‘pricing and promotion’ variable was insignificant. 
Hypothesis 3 (which postulated that as differences in pricing and promotion activities 
between follower and pioneer firms increase so will the erosion of market share), then, was 
not confirmed in our model 2. It appears that lowering prices more times and launching 
more promotional campaigns does not enable followers to take market share away from 
pioneers.  
There was support for hypothesis 4 - the more legal actions followers take in 
relation to pioneers, the greater the erosion in the first entrant’s market share (b=0.0453, 
p<0.01). As predicted, when followers take more non-market actions than pioneers such as 
filing lawsuits against their rivals or hauling them before fair trading bodies, the negative 
effect on the first entrant’s advantage is greater. 
As for the control variables, the coefficient associated with pioneer market share in 
the previous period is positive and significant (b=0.6409, p<0.001). This means that the 
more clients a pioneer firm has, the greater will be the erosion in its market share. In 
addition, the coefficient ‘order entry’ is also positive and significant (b=0.1791, 
p<0.001). Follower firms that enter at a later stage are able to prize more clients from 
pioneers than those competitors that entered at an earlier stage. The variable ‘months in 
monopoly’ is negative and significant (-0.0056, p<0.001). This means the longer pioneer 
firms were in monopoly, the more difficult it was to take market share from them. Finally, 
the variables related with industry life cycle, service penetration, and market growth turned 
out to be insignificant for the pioneer’s market share erosion.      
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[INSERT TABLE 3.5] 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study of competitive strategy behooves us to improve our knowledge of 
which actions and responses are most effective at obtaining a competitive advantage. 
This analysis is even more important in fast-changing industries, where it is better to be 
constantly on the lookout for competitive advantages in the short run rather than trying 
to build a position of sustainable competitive advantage. Firms’ strategies are dynamic, 
which explains why their actions have repercussions on their competitors’ behavior.  
This interdependent characteristic of competition is even more evident in the 
antagonistic relationship between pioneers and followers. Up to now empirical research 
has verified the existence of sustainable competitive advantages for the pioneer, even in 
fast changing industries (Makadok, 1998). We do not know, however, if the competitive 
behavior of the follower can have some impact on the erosion of this competitive 
advantage. To resolve this question, this paper has studied the difference in the pattern 
of competitive behavior of pioneers and followers in the European mobile telephone 
industry between 1997 and 2000. This is a dynamic industry where service penetration 
grew more than 600% in the four years under study - an average annual increase of 
more than 150%.  Moreover, it is an industry where any change initiated by the 
competition is easy to imitate, something that presumably favors greater competitive 
activity and reduces the likelihood of the pioneer holding onto the competitive 
advantage of entering the market first.   
Despite this, we have not been able to confirm that greater competitive activity 
by followers results in eroding the market share of the pioneer. Taking more 
competitive actions than the pioneer does not help to significantly reduce its first-mover 
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advantage. Being a competitively active follower in a fast-changing industry does not 
lessen the pioneer’s advantage. This could be because not all competitive actions are 
equally effective, which is why we distinguished between market and non-market 
actions. Among the former, we studied innovation actions and pricing and promotion, 
obtaining a similar result for both. We did not find a significant relationship between 
erosion of the pioneer’s market share and relative innovative activity, or between 
competitive activity and price and promotion.   
Follower firms can learn from the pioneer’s mistakes by introducing 
technological improvements. They should also benefit from the reduced commercial 
risk (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) and from being able to act as a free-rider on 
the pioneer's investments (Kalyanaram et al., 1995). On the other hand, the unsuccessful 
nature of the follower’s market actions could be due to higher than anticipated 
switching costs. Apart from the issue of number portability, it could be that clients were 
reluctant to change companies while the product was working (Schmalensee, 1982, 
Kalyanaram et al., 1995, Bohlmann et al., 2002). Finally, although pioneers cannot stop 
new firms moving into recently liberalized industries24, they can try to restrict 
competition by making life difficult for follower firms. Pioneers can do this by not 
giving full access to their own assets, one example being base stations, which they were 
legally obliged to cede for a limited period (Laffont et al., 1997). 
Even if market actions do not work, however, new entrants still have another line 
of attack: non-market actions such as lawsuits brought before courts and regulatory bodies 
(Baumol, 1993; Yao, 1997). Our empirical research confirms that these actions are ways of 
attacking competitors. We found that they are the only actions capable of significantly 
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eroding the pioneer’s market share. Non-market actions are presumably more difficult to 
react to than either tactical or even strategic market actions. They are one-off actions that 
are capable of disorienting competitors, which is why they seem to be so threatening to the 
pioneer’s competitive advantage.  
Not all non-market actions, of course, are the same. Shaffer et al. (2000) studied 
actions that a priori seem to have a more direct effect on sales and market share25. Our 
study, meanwhile, analyzes the effects of the plaintiff’s announcement of impending 
legal action, not the elimination of restrictions on competition that results from a 
lawsuit. We found a positive and significant relationship between such announcements 
and the erosion of the pioneer’s market share. It is paradoxical that none of the actions 
that theoretically should have some immediate effect on market share are effective, 
while legal actions that have no direct influence on sales are the only ones capable of 
significantly eroding the pioneer’s market share.   
To sum up, it appears that Makadok’s (1998) findings still hold true: being first 
is an advantage in a fast changing industry where any competitive action can be copied 
or improved on easily. Only ‘atypical’ non-market measures like legal action seem to 
cause any significant erosion of the pioneer’s market share.  
 This work is not free from limitations. We use the market share variable to 
measure the erosion of competitive advantage, something that has been criticized as this 
method of gauging performance has been shown to increase the probability of finding 
pioneer advantages (VanderWerf and Mahon, 1997). Using measurements of financial 
performance for a cross-country study like this one, however, would have been difficult 
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 Despite this, it has been shown empirically that at the beginning of the 1980s British Telecom’s non-
market strategy was specifically designed to hamper the deregulation process in its domestic market 
(Bonardi, 1999). 
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as accounting practices differ from country to country. In the period under study the 
mobile telephone businesses were not independently quoted, so we were also unable to 
use stock market wealth as a measurement.  
Apart from the actions studied in this research, firms make other types of 
competitive moves that in many cases are sequenced (Ferrier, 2001). This would have 
made it desirable to have had fuller information on the firms’ competitive behavior. 
Finally, the measurement of firms’ resource endowments is not highly accurate. 
Obtaining better information on each of the competitor’s resources is one of our 
objectives for the future. We would also like to do further research on the relationship 
between the appearance of legal action and the erosion of competitive advantage.  
This study’s practical recommendations are clear. Litigation is expensive for the 
firms involved26  (Schuler, 1996; Salop and White, 1986) and the economic system  
(Baumol, 1993). We need to analyze, therefore, how to improve the effectiveness of 
market actions so that follower firms are not forced to fall back on litigation as their 
only efficient competitive weapon.  We have also found that the erosion of the pioneer’s 
competitive advantage depends on two factors: length of time in monopoly and legal 
actions. Governments, then, should open the market and remove all restrictions on 
competition as soon as possible. These measures should be more effective than the 
competitive actions that firms take. They would also reduce the temptation to resort to 
courts and regulatory agencies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
25
 They included public relations activities, testimony before Congress, testimony before administrative 
agencies, filing administrative petitions, and lobbying. 
26
 In Spain, Telefónica has been fined many times by the Spanish Office of Fair Trading (OFT). At the 
end of 2004 it had received ten fines totaling more than 75 million euros from the OFT. (Information 
obtained from the Spanish OFT’s web site www.tdcompetencia.es/). Telefónica has also been fined 
several times (the largest was 18 million euros in July 2002) by the Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones (Spain’s telecommunications regulatory authority).   
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Figure 2.1  
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Graph 3.1 
 Penetration of digital mobile telephone services in Europe (in %) 
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Table 3.1 
Types of competitive actions 
 
TYPE OF 
ACTION 
 
DEFINITION 
 
EXAMPLE 
INNOVATION  Actions that involve product launches, improved services 
or investments to improve the technology.   
Movistar launches new SIM 
cards with enhanced services. 
PRICING AND 
PROMOTION 
Actions designed to cut the cost of a service or product or 
to persuade clients to buy or continue buying. 
Bouyes lowers its prices for 
corporate clients. 
LEGAL Legal action taken by the companies under study against 
their competitors. Apart from lawsuits, public statements are 
also included (e.g., in press conferences, newspapers, etc.). 
T-mobil sues Mannesman 
over its publicity campaign. 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Definition of Control Variables used in the study 
Months in monopolym.  Number of months the government of the country ‘m’ took to grant a 
second license to a firm to operate with digital technology.   
 
Penetrationtm.   Percentage of potential users in the country ‘m’ who already have 
mobile digital telephone service in the period ‘t’. 
 
Growthtm.    Change in number of clients in two consecutive time periods in the 
country ‘m’. 
 
Order of entryjm27.  Position in which the follower firm ‘j’ entered the geographical 
market ‘m’.  
 
Pioneer market share i(t-1)m. Percentage of clients of company ‘i’ in the period ‘t-1’ in the 
geographical market ‘m’. 
 
                                                          
27
 ‘Order of entry’ is considered as a proxy for the variables ‘size’ and ‘age’ – data on which are not 
available. 
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Table 3.3  
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficientsa 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Market share 
erosion  
0.293 0.496            
2. Competitive 
intensitya 
-3.525 7.996 -0.04           
3. Innovation 
actionsa 
-2.172 4.621 0.01 0.83          
4. Pricing and 
promotion a 
-0.495 2.592 -0.15 0.61 0.35         
5. Legal actionsa 0.217 0.779 0.10 0.13 0.06 -0.12        
6. Months in 
monopoly 
10.676 15.872 -0.06 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.13 -0.12      
7. Market 
growth 
33.818 16.127 0.01 0.07 0.14 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.19     
8. Service’s 
penetration 
33.939 19.736 -0.02 -0.13 -0.20 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.39    
9. Order entry 2.382 0.596 0.12 -0.27 -0.21 -0.05 -0.14 0.09 0.10 0.16 -0.09   
10. Pioneer’s 
market sharet-1 
0.534 0.150 0.06 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.19 -0.05 0.59 0.31 -0.24 -0.02  
a These variables are pioneer-follower difference scores representing relative competitive activity 
Table 3.4  
VIF 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variable VIF  Variable VIF 
Pioneer’s market sharet-1 1.5  Pioneer’s market sharet-1 1.53 
Market growth 1.37  Months in monopoly 1.39 
Months in monopoly 1.36  Market growth 1.38 
Service’s penetration 1.32  Service’s penetration 1.32 
Order entry 1.18  Innovation  1.25 
Competitive intensity 1.09  Order entry 1.21 
   Pricing and promotion  1.18 
   Legal  1.08 
     
Table 3.5 
Regression results a,b 
          a
 N=183 in all models 
 b
 *p<0.05;  **p<0.01;  ***p<0.001 
         c These variables are pioneer-follower difference scores representing relative competitive activity 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B s.e. b s.e. 
Competitive intensityc 0.0012 0.0027000   
Innovation actionsc   0.0044 0.0039000 
Pricing and promotion actionsc   -0.0119 0.0072*** 
Legal actionsc   0.0453 0.0174**0 
Months in monopoly -0.0028 0.0009***  -0.0029 0.0007*** 
Market growth 0.0027 0.0011*00 0.0017 0.0010000 
Service’s penetration -0.0002 0.0011000 0.0004 0.0009000 
Order entry 0.1412 0.0486** 0.1791 0.0449*** 
Pioneer’s market sharet-1 0.7793 0.2066*** 0.6409 0.1657*** 
Constant -0.5096 0.1473*** -0.5868 0.1507*** 
Rho 0.4622  0.3812  
Log likelihood -0.6422 -10.3218 

2
  (d.f.) 34.14(6)*** 63.81(8)*** 
